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The Renewal of Chinese Marxism:  




This is a study of those Chinese political economists and political philosophers 
in the early 1950s who sought to distance China's transition to socialism from 
the Soviet model for development. Writing for the leading economic and 
philosophical journals, Xin Jianshe [New Construction] and Xuexi [Study], 
these theorists attempted to apply Mao's 1937 call for a siniﬁed Marxism to 
their contemporary reality by insisting upon a national strategy for socialist 
construction. Their arguments provided a source for the later break with the 
Soviet command economy. And it is the emphasis upon Chinese solutions to 
national problems that forms a line that connects this past with China's present.*
Keywords: state capitalism, new economy policy, siniﬁcation, cooperativization, 
transition to socialism, Soviet model.
Introduction 
This is a study of the arguments of a group of party theorists in the early 
1950s who insisted upon the uniqueness of China's socialist transition. 
Writing for the leading journals of Marxist political economy, Xin Jianshe 
[New Construction], and Marxist political philosophy, Xuexi [Study], 
these economists and philosophers insisted upon a contrastive path to 
the Soviet paradigm of development. Though it has been generally as-
sumed that during this period China was simply following the Soviet 
model of a command economy (Schurmann 1966: 220-308; Teiwes 1993: 
5-86), it was abandoned in the late 1950s. In fact, the search for a Chinese 
road to economic construction may be traced back to the reassessments 
of party theorists at the beginning of the decade.
In this search for a national deﬁnition of the political economy, these 
theorists sought to balance political and economic demands through 
a stress upon originality. It was in the early 1950s that a somewhat 
experimental approach to the economy, incorporating the market, was 
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ﬁrst advanced. In this regard there is a line of continuity between the 
past and China's present.
China's movement to a market economy has been a product of a 
nationalist approach. As has been noted, it has been neither founded 
nor guided by any well-established theory. China's movement from a 
planned to a market economy has been as experimental as it has been 
gradual and particularistic (Lin et al. 1996).
At the same time these economic reforms have continued to be deﬁned 
(however loosely) within the more general vocabulary and framework 
of a transition to socialism. Though evidence suggests otherwise, there 
still is formal political adherence to a goal of a more advanced form of 
socialism. There is then an apparent tension between the exigencies of 
political legitimacy and the requisites of economic construction. Since 
the justiﬁcation of communist rule may not be found in a capitalist 
economy, economic reforms have to be seen, ofﬁcially at least, as part 
of something else: elements of a movement towards socialism.
It is to be expected that China's contemporary approach would be 
unique both as regards pace and direction. The search for 'real market 
socialism' suggests an originality to approach (Brus and Laski 1989). Yet 
within this distinctive strategy for growth there is an aspect of ideological 
continuity: there is a dialectic of continuity within discontinuity.
The early 1950s were also characterized by an attempt to deﬁne a 
political and economic programme of national design. This was the time 
when theorists ﬁrst sought to create a consensus as to a national road 
within the strictures of ideology. Though it is clear that there has been 
a qualitative break in China with its economic past, it is important to 
look back at the arguments of party theorists in the early 1950s. To do 
so is to highlight a line of constancy where a nationalist perspective has 
always had to balance economic and political reality with the demands 
of the formal expression of purpose.
'State Capitalism': The Tenet of Separation
In 1953 the Chinese Communist Party declared a General Line on the 
Transition to Socialism (Mao 1977: 102). With an emphasis on ﬁrst, the 
development of heavy industry at the expense of light industry and ag-
riculture; second, on speed; and third a reliance on imported machinery, 
equipment and technical assistance from the Soviet Union, it seemed 
that China was following a Soviet path for economic development. This 
was the model of the command economy that had evolved from the 
40_______________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 22•2005
James Falkin _______________________________________________________________
particular circumstances of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s to become 
a general prescriptive pattern for growth (Brus and Laski 1989).1
Though Nicholas Lardy (1987: 160) asserts that the adoption of this 
model was surprisingly uncontroversial for the CCP, this was not the 
case. There was a group of political economists who were intent upon 
emphasizing the need for a gradual and speciﬁc approach to China's 
transition. These political economists drew a distinction between their 
contemporary moment and that of the Soviet Union during the early 
days of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Their point of 
contrast was not with the origins of the command economy, rather they 
went back much earlier to the state capitalist policies of Lenin in order 
to highlight the particular character of China's underdevelopment. As 
Shen Zhiyuan, one of the three editors of New Construction wrote:
The fundamental nature of our country's political power and that of the 
Soviet Union is identical. However our country's historical conditions and 
those of the Soviet Union are not the same. Thus the form and function of 
state capitalism in our transition period and that which occurred in the Soviet 
Union are also different. (Shen 1953: 1)
It is important ﬁrst to understand the idea of state capitalism in the 
NEP. The NEP was essentially an agricultural programme designed 
to stimulate the supply of basic foodstuffs and raw materials through 
internal trade. State regulation was to be relaxed as requisition was re-
placed by a tax-in-kind. Trade in general was to be conducted through 
the 'formation of an internal market' and the development of monetary 
exchange. Heavy industry was to be de-emphasized in favour of small 
industry, which would either be private or run as a cooperative. State 
enterprises were thus to compete with private traders and cooperatives 
through the market. As Lenin wrote in 1921:
Now the struggle between communist and private management is transferred 
to the economic plane, to the market, where nationalized industry, 
concentrated in the hands of the workers' state, must, by applying itself to 
the conditions of the market and to the methods of competition in it, win 
for itself decisive mastery. (Quoted in Carr 1950: 334)
This is what Lenin referred to as state capitalism: market capitalism 
under the power of the Soviet state.
Freedom and rights or cooperatives in present conditions in Russia mean 
freedom and rights for capitalism … but 'cooperative capitalism', as distinct 
from private commercial capitalism is under Soviet power a species of state 
capitalism, and as such is beneﬁcial and useful to us at present. (Ibid.: 336)
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The idea of state capitalism was critically important to China's political 
economists. They saw it as a starting point and as a portal through which 
they could develop a more extensive discussion concerning the state of 
the economy. As a general concept signifying the process of transforming 
capitalism into socialism, it could be traced back both to the Common 
Programme and to the Draft Constitution. Indeed Mao had character-
ized the economy in 1953 as state capitalist, and had talked of 'various' 
forms of state capitalism (Mao 1977). But it was unclear as to what he 
meant by all this, and it seemed at best simply a statement of ﬂeeting 
signiﬁcance. This certainly was not a description of an economic policy 
committed to rapid industrialization. Still, cloudy as it seemed to be, 
state capitalism was a legitimate political notion open to interpretation. 
And as those who wrote for New Construction were intent upon limiting 
the pace of economic reform, they read into this phrase a statement of 
complexity, a recognition of a lengthy process.
This was brought about through contrast, through the particulariza-
tion of the universal. State capitalism became raised to the level of an 
abstract noun, a historic stage that all transitions were to pass through 
in a speciﬁcally determined manner. In this regard, uniqueness was 
made manifest through the particular function of state capitalism within 
each economy. Shen, for example, argued that whereas state capitalism 
was an external relationship in the Soviet Union, in China the relation-
ship was internal: the state participated directly in the management of 
private enterprises:
The principal form of state capitalism that the Soviet Union adopted at 
that time [1921] was to follow a system of leasing and hiring. But today 
the principal form that our country adopts is one of public and private 
partnership. We do not lease or rent. (Shen 1953: 1)
At the same time, Qian Jiazhu stressed that while state capitalism 
in the Soviet Union acted as the mediation between small production 
and socialism, in China it served as the link between capitalism and 
socialism:
Can we compare our economy today [1954] with that of the Soviet Union 
in 1921? Without a doubt we consider we cannot. Although we are also 
a country where small production is supreme, we already have today a 
strong state economy and a rapidly developing cooperative economy. And 
from our state industrial enterprises and cooperative enterprises we have 
already established a link with the agricultural economy. Therefore our state 
capitalism is a transition from capitalist industry towards socialism, and is 
not a transition from small production towards socialism. (Qian 1954a: 38)
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Though China's economy might be more advanced than that of the 
NEP of 1921, it was still far too underdeveloped to emulate the Soviet 
command economy. 'At present,' Qian wrote, 'our economy is relatively 
backward' (Qian 1954b: 18). And thus both Qian and Shen ﬁxed upon 
the concept of state capitalism, and interpreted it as a somewhat epochal 
process consisting of three lengthy stages. With respect to industry and 
capital accumulation, China was to move gradually from a situation 
where private capitalists were beginning to depend upon the state to 
that of an external alliance between the state and private capital, until 
that moment when the state would directly control all industry.
Concomitant with the development of the productive forces, there 
would be an evolution in the thinking guiding production. Ideological 
consciousness would grow with the improvements in technology.
It should be pointed out that going through the practice of state capitalism to 
transform private industry involves the transformation of private industry 
and the transformation of the private industrialist. These two aspects are 
uniﬁed and cannot be separated. The transformation of industry means 
going through each kind of state capitalism to make industry prosper, so 
that it is able to suit the needs of the national economy. To make, that is, 
industrial productive relations correspond to the developing requirements 
of the productive forces. The transformation of the individual occurs by 
going through state capitalism under the direct leadership of the socialist 
economic sector, to teach and transform the private industrialists, to make 
them become patriotic industrialists. (Qian 1954c: 16)
This sanguine approach to ideological reformation was shaped by a 
distinct view of the position of national capital in China. According to 
Qian, a violent struggle against this counter-revolutionary class was 
not necessary because these capitalists did not dream of restoration. 
Nurtured under the yoke of semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism, this 
speciﬁcally Chinese class was weak, and yet progressive in that it was 
willing to aid national construction. This was why they could be peace-
fully transformed (Qian 1954b: 16).
For Qian and Shen this point was critical because it underscored the 
uniqueness of China within the generality of the socialist experience. 
They argued that China might avoid the kind of forced liquidation of 
capital that had occurred in the Soviet Union. 
The historical responsibility for the progressive transformation of state 
capitalism is the special responsibility of our socialist revolution. It did not 
previously exist in the Soviet Union, and it does not exist in today's Eastern 
European Democracies. (Qian 1954a: 38)
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The key here was the idea that difference was the necessary expres-
sion of the general prescriptions of Marxism. The universal truth that all 
socialist states needed to go through a transition to socialism only had 
meaning as the concrete, speciﬁc experience of each state. Qian was not 
trying to celebrate the achievements of China's economy in comparison 
to that of the Soviet Union at a similar stage of development; rather he 
was emphasizing the particularity of historical experience.
[It] severs the historical condition to quote a section from Lenin's 'On the Grain 
Tax' to try and explain the function of state capitalism in our transition period. 
Without question his analysis of the why and wherefore of small production 
is completely unsuited for our contemporary practice. (Ibid.: 39) 
This stress on speciﬁcity was itself the reassertion of the cardinal 
principle of Maoist ideology: the siniﬁcation of Marxism. Mao's claim to 
power had been based upon the axiom that Marxism required a national 
form. As he said in 1938, at the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee:
What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, 
that is Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions 
prevailing in China, and not Marxism used abstractly … Consequently, 
the siniﬁcation of Marxism—that is to say, making certain that in all of its 
manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics, using it according 
to Chinese particularities—becomes a problem that must be understood and 
solved by the whole party without delay. (Schram 1989: 70)
The point here is that though Shen and Qian saw China's economy 
as far too backward to sustain a rapid drive for industrialization, and 
though they disagreed with the line of the 1st Five-Year Plan, their argu-
ment was, in its assertion of the need for an economic policy of national 
design, a restatement of the principle of siniﬁcation. Thus, while the 
CCP was formally accepting a foreign model for development, political 
economists, following from the tenets of Maoist ideology, were empha-
sizing that the meaning of Marxism was dependent upon a particular 
realization. As Shen wrote:
Within our life, within our practical struggle, according to this time here 
and now, in these concrete situations and conditions we adapt all workable 
methods. This is a matter for China's people themselves. The responsibility 
of creative Marxism is to utilize the ideological method of Marxism, based 
on the spirit and essence of Marxism, and unite it with China's concrete 
situation. (Shen 1953: 4)
This stress upon the particular seemingly implied a complete freedom 
to Marxist interpretation. The idea that meaning was dependent upon 
a speciﬁc realization clearly encouraged notions of subjectivity. And 
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it was precisely to prevent voluntarism, and to see China's speciﬁcity 
in terms of economic gradualism that Shen began to re-emphasize the 
precepts of the objective laws of Marxism.
He used Stalin's 'law of correspondence' for socialist transitions 
(namely that the relations of production must always correspond to the 
level of the productive forces), to argue that China's economy needed 
to be overhauled in a steady and particular fashion. What he said was 
that the requirements of this law justiﬁed both a primary emphasis upon 
the development of the productive forces, and a prior transformation 
of these productive forces to make all this possible. In other words, he 
used this law to legitimate whatever he wanted. 
He began by stating that the general line for the transition was based 
upon, 'the objective law and afﬁrmation that the relations of production 
must be in conformity with the character of the productive forces' (Shen 
1954: 11). This meant that, 'to realize the thorough transformation of the 
economic form, or to realize completely the transformation of the produc-
tive relations of each economic sector, it is necessary to strive to transform 
the technical conditions' (ibid.: 13).2 At the same time he wrote:
within our present small agricultural economy there is little possibility of 
being able to improve the situation of technology. The key determinant to 
such an improvement in agricultural technology lies in transforming the 
productive relations of the small agricultural economy; transforming the 
small agricultural system. (Ibid.: 18)
Shen, who had written on Hegel in the 1930s in Shanghai, knew 
that this argument was illogical. The relations of production may not 
precede the very level of the productive forces that they are supposed 
to suit. But what Shen was searching for in all of this was an injunction 
against subjectivism. 'Correspondence' had to signify restraint. 'In the 
end,' he said,
the line demands that under the prerequisite of the possible and the necessary 
there be a gradual process of going through each kind of state capitalism 
to realize gradually the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and 
commercial enterprises. This does not require, for example, the use of a paper 
law to nationalize immediately. (Ibid.: 18)
Shen's circular argument showed the difﬁculty of attempting to adapt 
the tenets of classical Marxism to what was, in these terms, an unantici-
pated situation. Whatever the spin of Stalin's law, it could not replace 
the axioms of nineteenth-century Marxism, with its stress upon the pri-
macy of the productive forces. Yet in non-capitalist formations such as 
China in the 1950s, a stress on the determinacy of the productive forces 
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undercut the party line that the transition to socialism would be guided 
by already existing socialist relations. To stress the backward level of 
the productive forces seemingly mocked the idea of a correspondence 
between base and superstructure. How could socialist relations suit an 
underdeveloped economic base? And yet to give meaning to the overall 
political line while offering recommendations as to course required that 
statements of substantive intent manoeuvre through a ﬁeld of structural 
imperatives.
The Singular Approach  
of the Translator of Marx's Capital 
Shen and Qian tried to manipulate the notion of objective law in order 
to put a brake on excess. The fear was that of a sudden chiliastic move-
ment to try and transform the economic reality, a leap to create a Marxist 
rectiﬁcation of names where socialist relations truly suited a newly real-
ized socialist base. Their differences over policy, whether immediate in 
relation to the Soviet model for industrialization, or immanent in relation 
to the swing of voluntarism, were nevertheless expressed through the 
categorical framework of siniﬁcation. In this regard, it was to be expected 
that the injunction to adapt Marxism to China would lead to a more crea-
tive attempt than that of trying to balance objective law with economic 
reality. Instead moving within the same categorical framework, the next 
step would be to try and redeﬁne the discourse of political economy 
in terms of novel constructs appropriate to its new moment. The idea 
would be to relocate the concepts and categories of political economy 
within new laws and contradictions. Ironically, or perhaps logically, it 
was the translator of Capital, Wang Xuewen, a member of the Central 
Committee and an editor of New Construction, who attempted to redeﬁne 
the discourse of China's Marxist political economy.
The economy, Wang said, comprises ﬁve very loosely connected sec-
tors. These included the socialist system of the state-owned economy, 
the semi-socialist system, the capitalist system of private ownership, the 
individual system of ownership, and state capitalism. In fact, they were 
basically self-sufﬁcient entities governed by their own distinctive laws. 
'The cooperative economy has its own principal laws, [and] the state-run 
economy has its own principal laws' (Wang 1954a: 35). There was no 
overall deﬁnition of the economy. Indeed he chastized those who 'see 
a link between each kind of sector in the transition period, but who do 
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not recognize the particularity and the certain kind of independence of 
each kind of economy' (ibid.: 35).
The question was not one of emphasis, of stressing the parts rather 
than the whole. On the contrary, Wang was arguing that the nature of 
these sectors prevented a workable concept of unity. This meant that 
there could not be a fundamental economic law that could characterize 
this period. This was not an epoch or an era such as feudalism, capitalism 
or socialism. This was instead a moment distinguished by complexity, 
with a concomitant series of principal laws. And thus the state-run 
economy could not deﬁne the method or function of distribution and 
exchange in these other economies. 'There are those comrades,' Wang 
wrote, 'who do not recognize that the cooperative economy and the 
individual economy have their own economic laws' (ibid.: 35).
Because each economy has its own different conditions, the guiding function 
of the state-run economy receives, in one respect, the limitations and 
strengths of its [own] economic situation. At the same time, it also receives 
the limitations of other economic conditions. Although the state-run economy 
has as its basis the guiding economic laws of socialism, it certainly is not as 
it is in socialism where it constitutes the fundamental law determining the 
whole society. (Ibid.)
Wang's point was to try and redirect analysis towards what was truly 
speciﬁc abut this economy. This is why the denial of a fundamental law 
was so important, because it prevented the reincorporation of diversity 
within the more traditional nomenclature of capitalism and socialism. 
Instead, it focused concepts and categories upon China's present. To 
Wang, theorists who looked to the Soviet past to ﬁnd a contemporary 
meaning for China failed to grasp the reality of China's uniqueness.
They do not understand that Lenin's analysis arose from concrete economic 
conditions. They do not understand that it indicated the transition to socialism. 
Our situation in the transition period is very complicated, and cannot be seen 
simply as a transition from capitalism to socialism, from these two kinds 
of constructs, each with its own [economic] tendency. It certainly does not 
summarize the ﬁve kinds of economic forms of our present. (Ibid.: 36)3
Where Shen and Qian had compared China favourably in relation 
to the NEP, Wang saw China as lagging behind. And critically, this led 
him to argue that the party had misunderstood the entire character of 
the individual economy. It was not, he said, simply a small producing 
sector; it also comprised a large self-sustaining sector. The same terms 
were being incorrectly applied to what were in fact two distinct groups: 
one that produced for the market and one that tried merely to survive. 
_________________________________________________________________________47
_____________________________________________ The Renewal of Chinese Marxism
'Within our small peasant economy there are two sectors whose characters 
are different and cannot be mixed … it may not be said that the commodity 
producing sector has killed the naturally producing sector' (ibid.: 37).
This was a unique argument for a party theorist. To the degree that 
the party admitted that there was an individual economy, it was seen as 
a commodity-producing sector. Mao had noted that there were forms of 
communal ownership in China, but they were in the national minority 
areas (Mao 1977: 144). To suggest otherwise, to follow Wang's thesis that 
the individual economy was a complex economy in itself, independent 
of any overriding determination, undercut the idea of a rapid transition 
to socialism. The productive forces would have to be considered as far 
too backward to admit to anything other than a very gradual process 
of transition. Most importantly, and of immediate concern, to confuse 
a commodity-producing economy with a self-subsistent individual 
economy meant that the state would be purchasing grain from those 
who needed it to survive. The refusal to separate the subsistence and 
marketing sectors would mean that in the compulsory purchase of 
grain, the state would unknowingly extract that which many peasants 
needed simply to exist. 
If one mistakenly believes that the small peasant economy is equivalent 
to small commodity producers, it will lead to the effect that there will be a 
purchase of residuary food stuffs, and a compulsory purchase of the daily 
intake of the peasant will be inevitable. (Wang 1954a: 37)
He was right. Within a year there was a grain supply crisis caused by 
the system of uniﬁed purchase (Lardy 1987: 162).4 After some time, the 
party admitted that there were cases where peasants did not have suf-
ﬁcient food. This was blamed on a variety of factors: cadre inefﬁciency, 
bureaucratism, and hoarding by rich and middle peasants (Bernstein 
1969: 365-99). Clearly, this was also caused by the lack of an objective 
and detailed understanding of the countryside. Ultimately, it was far 
easier, and certainly politically more palatable, to see the small produc-
ing economy as coherent, whole and manageable, to see it as an element 
within the capitalist economy to be utilized, than to understand it as a 
primitive economic form subject to its own laws. 
Wang's argument thus redeﬁned the concept of transition in Chinese 
Marxism. The process now involved the transformation of a small pro-
ducing sector and a subsistence-level economy.
Our country is not simply in a transition towards socialism but is still in 
transition from an individual economy towards socialism. Within our state 
economy, the individual economy occupies the moving force, and it is not 
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simply a commodity producing sector. There are still many kinds of self-
sufﬁcient sectors. (Wang 1954a: 36)
In turn, this idea of the economy as a composite series of economies, 
each characterized by their own principal laws, seemed to suggest a 
need for new analytic constructs. The particularity of China's under-
development appeared to demand a more novel approach to Marxist 
political economy. This was after all, as was noted, Mao's call for a sini-
ﬁed Marxism. The problem for Wang, as it was for Shen and Qian, was 
that a stress on speciﬁcity not only risked endorsing voluntarism, it also 
seemingly detached China's road from the more general suppositions 
of a transition to socialism. 
What Wang needed therefore was an economic sector that he could 
identify as either semi-socialist or socialist. This would permit him 
to emphasize a gradualistic process whereby he could locate China's 
unique situation within the more universal framework of Marxist 
economic precepts. This Wang found in the cooperative movement, 
which he characterized as semi-socialist. This allowed a subsistence-
level economy to be seen positively, to have a place within the Marxist 
continuum. Though speciﬁcally Chinese, the economy shared a more 
generally planned future as a socialist economy. This act of conceptual 
balance was brought about through contrast.
The transitional period in the Soviet Union had a primitive form of a small 
commodity agricultural economy. In our country this is the individual 
economy (it contains the natural economic sector and the small commodity 
sector). In the beginning of the Soviet Union's transition period, the 
cooperative economy was a state capitalist economy, afterwards it was a 
socialist economy. Our cooperative economy certainly is not a capitalist 
cooperative economy, and is not a state capitalist economy, but is a semi-
socialist and socialist cooperative economy. (Wang 1954b: 10)
Wang's concern was not with the extent of socialism within the 
cooperative movement. His point was that a new moment required 
new ideas. And this gave rise to and became the expression of more 
contemporary norms.
Marxist-Leninist political economy is without a study of semi-socialist 
cooperative economies. It is of course without a study of the laws of semi-
socialist cooperative economies. China's revolutionary practice created the 
semi-socialist cooperative economy. This kind of economy possesses its own 
economic conditions, naturally it produces its own laws. (Wang 1954a: 36)
To attempt to realize the consequences of particularism within origi-
nal concepts threatened the discursive order. It stated that the intellec-
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tual moorings of the grid needed to be rethought. And to the degree 
that this could ever occur, this certainly was a prerogative of the elite. 
Moreover, the speciﬁc emphasis upon the complex status of the indi-
vidual economy clearly undermined state intention, as this demanded 
a separate understanding of the transition to socialism. The irony was 
that this was precisely the kind of creative adaptation of Marxism that 
siniﬁcation presupposed. 
Given that Wang was both a member of the Central Committee and 
the translator of Capital, his argument demanded a response. And in a 
long and considered article, 'Several Problems Concerning the Essence 
and Laws of Our Country's Transitional Period', two political econo-
mists, Du Ruji and Yu Shudong, restated a more orthodox position by 
arguing that Wang had misunderstood the character of the economy 
(Du and Yu 1954: 19).
Du and Yu began with the critical assertion that there was only one 
law governing the economy. Laws, they said, exist within a hierarchy, 
uniﬁed and deﬁned by that which controls. One rules, the rest are 
ruled. 'And the ruling economy inﬂuences the other economies in such 
a way that they lose their independent developing character' (ibid.: 20). 
In the transition period, led by a uniﬁed Communist Party, the ruling 
sector was the socialist economy. It was thus to be seen as that which 
sharpened the antagonism between capitalism and socialism. Indeed, 
the very meaning of the transition was made manifest in the imposition 
of state will upon the private sectors.
As long as it was accepted that the socialist economy, or socialist 
economies, determined the complexity of unity, then clearly the contra-
diction with capitalism was the key to this period. Conversely, Wang's 
approach, his emphasis upon discrete laws and sectors, understated 
this antimony in favour of concomitant tensions. And it was this that 
Du and Yu found intolerable. 'If it is taken that in the transition period, 
each economic sector has 'its own principal laws', then by considering 
all these laws as equal, the struggle between fully developing socialism 
and dying capitalism is destroyed' (ibid.: 20). Wang had made a serious 
mistake: 'our transition period's particular contradiction is between 
socialism and capitalism' (ibid.).
This brought everything back to more familiar ground. It also restored 
the more conventional insights of Lenin and Stalin. And according to Du 
and Yu, it was precisely the Leninist heritage that Wang had ignored. 
He 'exaggerates the distinction between China and the Soviet Union, 
and thereby destroys the universal signiﬁcance of Lenin's proclamations 
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concerning the transition period' (ibid.). Although China's particular 
form of underdevelopment required the stage of 'New Democracy', in 
terms of a macro view, especially with regard to commodity production 
in the countryside, China's situation was comparable to that of the Soviet 
Union in the late 1920s when rapid industrialization began.
The difference between the commodity production of our small agricultural 
economy and that of the Soviet Union at that time [1928] is not that great; thus, 
from the aspect of the individual economy the difference between the Soviet 
Union and us is one of degrees. It is not a qualitative difference. (Ibid.)
Everything depended upon how the individual economy was to be 
seen. Wang understood it as a separate economic sector with its own 
laws and character, while the more traditional view was that though a 
natural self-sustaining agricultural sector did exist as 'unsurmounted 
remains', they were too small to matter. Previously peasants treated 
produce as ground rent payable to the landlord, now this same pro-
duce became a commodity to be sold. Theoretically, the mistake was 
to see this category in absolute terms. 'It is not necessary to have a 100 
percent commodity production to call an economy a small commodity 
economy' (ibid.: 21).
In turn, each position carried with it a severe consequence. For Wang, 
to ignore the obvious and instead to rely on shibboleths meant agricul-
tural policies resulting in starvation: a grain crisis. To Du and Yu, not to 
impose state will upon a commodity-producing economy engendered 
capitalism. For them this was the all-embracing conﬂict that character-
ized the whole transition process.
We must guide the individual peasant economy towards socialism, and not 
allow its spontaneous development towards the road of capitalism. And it 
is because the individual economy is a small producing economy that in 
the transition period we utilize the circulation of commodities to promote 
trade between the state and cooperative societies, promote the circulation 
between town and country, and strengthen the alliance between workers 
and farmers. (Ibid.: 22)
Wang's attempt to recast the theoretical discourse so that it might be 
more appropriate to its political reality opened up the possibility for a 
different commitment to the idea of socialism. This represented both an 
achievement and a threat. For the effect of grounding the principle of 
speciﬁcity in a federated economic base was to demand the postpone-
ment of all substantive discussion regarding the transition as a somewhat 
immediate and recognizable goal. But this denied the very certainty 
which was not only an assumed right of state, but which had already 
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been summarized and classiﬁed in the Constitution. The state of the 
individual peasant economy had already been ofﬁcially deﬁned.
Wang's argument was unique and prescient. At the same time he 
also shared with his colleagues on New Construction an approach that 
stressed the particularity of China's experience. In this regard, their ideas 
represented a direct line to Mao's speech at the 6th Plenum in 1937. For 
the ﬁrst time since the seizure of power there was now substantive theo-
retical support for the belief that China's transition was fundamentally 
a matter for the Chinese people themselves. 
The Political Philosophers Weigh In
Political economists offered critical interpretations of the economic base. 
Their concern was less with the political and ideological superstructure 
than with the complexity of economic deﬁnition. But in order to de-
velop their points, these economists had to adopt the basic discursive 
framework of Chinese Marxist political theory. This was the categorical 
ground that shaped the attempts at conceptual breakthrough of those 
who wrote for the journal New Construction. In this regard, Wang's argu-
ment represented a decisive effort at shifting that ground at a categorical 
level. Whatever the success or failure in this regard, these economists had 
contributed to moving the argument back to the speciﬁcity of China. 
In this they were not alone. Political philosophers were also arguing 
over the character of this political economy and over the suitability of 
Soviet models. And corresponding to discussions of the base, these 
ideological controversies were expressed through a conceptual frame-
work that emphasized the particularity of Chinese Marxism. To make 
this clearer, it is important to look at the major dispute among political 
philosophers as to the nature of this transitional political economy.
The question of the state of this political economy was the subject 
of a bitter argument which took place in the Marxist-Leninist Institute 
over two years, 1953-55, between two philosophers, Ai Siqi and Yang 
Xianzhen. The two basic paradigms that they offered represented two 
opposing lines as to where China was, and how it could and should 
develop socialism.
Yang Xianzhen saw the base as a unity, as a whole constructed from 
the sum of its productive relations. 'The theory of the sum total of the 
relations of production is that there are all kinds of productive relations, 
and these co-exist at the same time' (Yang 1981a: 11). In turn, each pro-
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ductive relation was composed of three aspects: the form of ownership 
over the means of production; the method of exchange; and distribution. 
But in themselves these did not constitute a separate or quasi-independ-
ent system. Irrespective of difference or complexity, each productive 
sector was simply an element within the general order.
Within a society where the exploiters have not yet vanished, the 'base' itself 
just has the character of synthesis. To deny the character of synthesis to the 
transitional period is without basis, because Marx was very clear that the 
base was the social economic form. And the social economic form is the 
sum total of the productive relations. And is not the sum total synthesis. 
(Yang 1981b: 57)
If Marx is the arbiter here, the answer is no. Marx was writing from the 
stance of capitalism, analysing its dialectical underpinnings. He made 
it clear that in its beginning phase capitalism contained pre-capitalist 
economic formations. But as there had been a qualitative change in the 
dominant mode of production, these 'unsurmounted remains' only 
survived in a transﬁgured way.
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic 
organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure 
and relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose 
ruins and elements it built itself up, and whose partly still unconquered 
remnants are carried along within … [S]ince bourgeois society is itself only a 
contradictory form of development, relations derived from earlier forms will 
often be found within it only in an entirely stunted form, or even travestied. 
For example, communal property. (Marx 1973: 105-6)
In this regard, Marx's emphasis on the dynamic of continuity and 
discontinuity, his promised dictum of ineluctable economic change and 
conﬂict, seemingly had little in common with Yang's view of a static, 
integrated economy of equal parts.
As China's economy had been ofﬁcially characterized in terms of ﬁve 
productive relations, it was these forms that Yang understood to be 
the base. 'In the end the social economic formation of our transitional 
economy is constituted from ﬁve kinds of economic sectors' (Yang 
1981b: 42). And quoting from the 7th Plenum of the 7th Party Congress, 
he listed them as:
1. the socialist system of the state-owned economy
2. the cooperative or semi-socialist system of ownership
3. the capitalist system of private ownership
4. the system of individual ownership 
5. state capitalism.
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This was where he saw China to be at present. Concerning the achieve-
ment of socialism, he thought that the key lay with the extraordinary 
potential of the peasantry, particularly in their ability to forge a creative 
alliance with state industry. Indeed he went so far as to see this sector, 
which he also referred to as the individual economy, as the basis for 
socialist construction: 'In the practice of the transitional period, small 
agriculture must be the foundation of the socialist state' (ibid.: 48). And 
in this argument he found support from Lenin and Stalin:
Lenin and Stalin were very clear on this point. In the transitional period, 
before collectivization, to build a socialist economic basis meant uniting 
agriculture and industry into one integrated economy, subordinating 
agriculture to the leadership of socialist industry or using the products 
of large-scale industry to exchange for the products of the peasants. This 
agriculture referred to is individual agriculture and the peasants referred to 
naturally are individual peasants, not a collectivized peasantry. (Ibid.: 47)
In light of what followed in the Soviet Union, this celebration of the 
pre-collectivized peasantry is somewhat odd. And of course, irrespective 
of historical circumstance, it is strange to ﬁnd a Marxist panegyrize the 
peasantry. But it is perhaps less mystifying when it is made clear that for 
Yang, existence implied acceptance. The real was simply nothing more 
than the rational expression of immediately recognizable truth. 'That is 
to say, we must honestly recognize the world as it is, by its true colours: 
is thus is, is not thus is not, the earth just is the earth, to have just is to 
have, and to be without just is to be without' (Yang 1955a: 147). Thus 
the peasantry, the largest sector in the economy ('quite clearly, straight 
through till today, within our agriculture, individual agriculture still 
occupies the tendential force') had to be the foundation of what he saw 
as an integrated economy (Yang 1981b: 47). The predominant part of 
the whole had to be understood as the basis of that whole. To suggest 
otherwise, moving towards an emphasis upon antagonism and conﬂict, 
would have undermined his principle of synthesis.
But here the philosophical underpinnings of this idea are less impor-
tant than the fact that he felt that this argument had historical precedent. 
Yang believed that China's present was actually contemporaneous 
with the early stages of the NEP. And therefore he relied on Lenin's 
On Co-operation, which set the policy for the socialist transformation of 
agriculture in 1921, to justify the concept of the composite base.
In On Co-operation Lenin argued that since the working class controlled 
the means of production and monopolized political power, the basis of 
agricultural production should be peasant cooperatives. These voluntary 
institutions, which he had previously labelled as 'petty-bourgeois', but 
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had now been raised to a 'third type of commercial enterprise', were to 
be seen as the foundation of socialism.
The power of the state over all large-scale means of production; political power 
in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many 
millions of small and very small peasants, the assured proletarian leadership 
of peasantry, etc.—is this not all that is necessary to build a completely socialist 
society out of cooperatives; out of cooperatives alone which we formerly 
ridiculed as huckstering …? It is still not the building of socialist society, but 
it is all that is necessary and sufﬁcient for it. (Lenin 1975: 708)
It is not clear how serious Lenin was about this. As Moshe Lewin notes, 
Lenin had a tendency to connect the idea of socialism to any pressing 
task in order to motivate the populace (Lewin 1975: 95). When electri-
ﬁcation was the target, for example, socialism was deﬁned as 'Soviet 
power plus electriﬁcation'. And thus it is possible to see the identiﬁcation 
of socialism with cooperatives as an exaggerated attempt to mobilize 
the peasantry. Yang nevertheless took Lenin's words as a statement of 
principle for the transitional strategy:
Lenin's theory of co-operativization was the guiding principle for the 
movement of the labouring peasants towards socialism. It was the most 
important ideological weapon of the party and the government in the work 
of advancing the socialist transformation of the small peasant economy. It 
was the basis of the party's policy towards the peasants. (Yang 1955b: 2) 
Most importantly, Yang argued that underlying Lenin's conceptuali-
zation was the afﬁrmed tenet of synthesis, the belief in the seemingly 
inviolate link between the sectors. It is this that allowed for a somewhat 
blithe attitude towards the non-socialist sectors. Otherwise, in the 
sense of real class struggle, they would have to be seen as potentially 
counter-revolutionary, demanding suppression through, for example, 
collectivization. 'Lenin recognized that within the enterprise of socialist 
construction, the principle of socialist transformation is that the organi-
zational parts cannot be split' (ibid.: 2). 
Since Yang also assumed that state power in China was secure, it 
seemed clear that China's peasantry should serve as the rallying point for 
the transition. This now non-threatening class could be trusted to sup-
port all state efforts. In addition, what Yang saw as Lenin's tolerance of 
self-interest among the peasantry seemingly endorsed a somewhat static 
view of them. Cooperatives offered a gradual controlled process, in which 
personal gain could be combined with the overall good of the collective. 
Their value was that they were not an imperative for quick change. 
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Lenin considered that in the transition to socialism, all cooperative systems, 
especially the agricultural system were the easiest form for the individual 
peasant to receive and understand … It was the best form to unite private 
interest with that of the whole. (Ibid.)
This theme of social assembly, where state control mitigates conﬂict, 
was in turn extended by Yang to the private and semi-capitalist sector. 
As with peasant cooperatives, so the policy towards industry was to 
be a mixed form, a state capitalism, where ultimately proﬁt and activ-
ity would be determined by the state. 'Our present policy towards the 
capitalist industry of "utilize, restrict and transform" … is the concrete 
utilization in China of the policy which Lenin pointed out concerning 
state capitalism' (ibid.).
In arguing that rural policy should be seen in terms of the requirements 
of the peasantry, in particular the individual peasant, and that industry 
should adopt a state capitalist form, Yang felt that he had captured the 
essence of Lenin's transitional programme. In this regard, with his stress 
on the NEP and state capitalism, he was clearly echoing the arguments of 
those who were writing for New Construction. At the same time, in general 
Yang could also be seen as following the line of Bukharin. Though Yang 
did not talk of 'ultimately riding into socialism on the backs of the rich 
peasantry', and though he did not discuss the principle of equilibrium, 
the downgrading of class struggle, the idea of a 'third form' of production, 
placed Yang ﬁrmly within a Bukharinist approach. And in this, in histori-
cally parallel fashion, Yang shared an interpretation that separates Lenin 
from the later history of collectivization (Cohen 1975, chapters 4-9).
This is signiﬁcant because it represents a change that had occurred in 
Chinese political discourse. The former understanding of Soviet history 
as a complete model was now superseded by a view that saw Soviet 
history discretely, as relatively independent moments offering different 
sources for recommendation. Yang could not possibly have been una-
ware of the Stalinist collectivization campaign, and yet he chose simply 
to ignore it. And that he did so makes clear the lifting of any sense of 
prohibition to do otherwise. The logic that salvages Lenin by divorcing 
him from later practice is here founded upon an analysis that deﬁnes 
all of the Soviet past as basically data to be separated out for conceptual 
support. It is a reason that has conﬁdently moved beyond one particular 
form of categorical imperative. Though Yang's analysis was clearly out of 
the mainstream in respect to Soviet orthodoxy, this created no problem 
for him in China. The discursive territory had shifted. In Maoist terms, 
the arrow of Marxism was now falling on Chinese ground.
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This use of Soviet history as citation for more novel interpretation 
may also be seen in the writings of Yang's main philosophical and 
political opponent Ai Siqi, who was one of the leading editors of Xuexi 
[Study], and Zhexue Yanjiu [Philosophical Research]. Ai was a theorist 
of revolution. Whereas Yang seemingly legitimized his reality through 
somewhat circular reasoning—what is should be; and it should be, 
because it is—for Ai, all moments were historically conditional, factors 
within an ongoing process. Within this historical ﬂux there was a centre 
of gravity, this was the transcendent idea of socialist construction. Thus 
all events could be broken up into a contingent relation, as to whether 
or not a given economic sector aided or obstructed the transition to so-
cialism. China's economies would now be deﬁned in terms of whether 
they aided or obstructed a socialist base. 
What does our State have as its own economic base? Is it formed simultaneously 
of the four different systems of ownership, or is it formed only of the 
productive relations of the system of whole people's ownership, and the 
system of collective ownership that are being established? (Ai 1964: 6)
 Ai's question was not what was real; rather it was what was real for 
socialist construction? This meant that while capitalism and the indi-
vidual peasant economy were part of the transitional period, they were 
not part of the base. The problem with Yang's argument, Ai said, was 
that Yang misinterpreted supervision for acceptance.
In order to utilize the productive forces of capitalism, it was necessary … 
to show adequate concern for its productive relations, but it would be a 
mistake to think that this amounts to regarding capitalist relations as our 
own economic base. (Ibid.) 
To Yang this was apparently inexplicable, since it excluded that which 
was obviously there. And this is why he asked rhetorically: 'How do 
socialists eat? Do they not depend upon the very produce of those peas-
ants whom they seemingly ignore?' (Yang 1981b: 50). But to Ai this was 
an equally fatuous question, because it was empirical. His concern was 
with the realization of an idea. The state helped the peasants out of need, 
'for the purpose of obtaining material supplies from their productivity 
… and not because we want to consolidate and develop their produc-
tive relations' (Ai 1964: 10).
This restriction of the concept of the economic base to the relations 
of production was critically important because it provided a theoretical 
justiﬁcation for a socialist transition within conditions of underdevel-
opment. By narrowing the deﬁnition of the economy to the state of its 
productive relations, to its political or administrative situation, thereby 
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removing the forces of production and technology from the equation, Ai 
was now able to explain how socialist relations could precede economic 
development, and continue to direct the economy. The more traditional 
idea that a socialist transition presumed an achieved level of productivity 
was here replaced by an insistence that ultimately the state determined 
the character of the economy.
The reduction of the economy to its productive relations allowed Ai 
to regroup the various forms of ownership into the two antagonistic 
bases of socialism and capitalism.
The economy of the transition period is transitional … because the socialist 
base is only in the course of its formation. In its midst there still exists the 
capitalist base, though this base is steadily declining and dying. (Ibid.: 5) 
Non-socialist economies or non-socialist forms of ownership stood in 
relation to the socialist economy as productive forces, as instruments of 
production. They existed simply as use-value. 'Not everything which 
we can and must manage is the economic base of our state regime, 
and only that which we have to form and consolidate can be our own 
economic base' (ibid.: 9).
The emphasis was thus on transformation, upon supplanting that 
which was. In this regard, his argument followed the party line in see-
ing the command economy and rapid industrialization as the key to 
construction. Indeed he saw China's situation as analogous to that of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1920s when, as he understood it, class struggle 
was rife (Ai 1954: 3).
It helps to recall that during this time in China there were a number 
of ongoing campaigns to eradicate 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'class-
collaborationists'. The Sufan movement to purge anti-party elements, 
the excoriation of Hu Feng and the idea of 'bourgeois humanism', and 
the start-up of the criticism of Liang Shuming and the philosophy of 
pragmatism, lent support to the idea that this was a period characterized 
by antagonistic contradictions. The Gao Gang affair had only recently 
been resolved, and as Mao had noted, this was a manifestation of 'intense 
class-struggle at the present stage' (Mao 1977: 155).
To Ai, the method to overcome class conﬂict seemed clear: collec-
tivization and a concentration upon heavy industry. This is the way 
that Stalin 'defended and developed Lenin's thoughts on socialist 
industrialization' (Ai 1954: 4). This policy continued to be appropri-
ate, Ai said, because in China heavy industry is the 'pivot capable 
of driving all socialist industrialization forward' (ibid.). At the same 
time, collectivization was the foundation of industrialization. Though 
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collectivization was Stalin's speciﬁc response to the grain crisis, it still 
had general application. 
Stalin pointed out that in developing the construction of socialist industry, it's 
necessary to guide the individual peasant in an orderly fashion towards the 
road of collectivization, to construct a socialist basis in the villages. (Ibid.).
To refer to the Soviet collectivization campaign as orderly was de-
signed to reassure a domestic audience that adaptation did not suggest 
exact duplication. Not even the strongest supporters of rapid industriali-
zation were suggesting that China reintroduce a Soviet-style forced col-
lectivization. And other than setting out what might be called the general 
laws of entry into socialism, viz. collectivization and industrialization, 
Ai had little to say concerning detailed economic or political strategy. 
This is not surprising; as a political philosopher his central concern was 
more with the role of consciousness in shaping the material base than 
it was with a detailed analysis of the political economy.
In this regard, the fact that he did not simply repeat the basics of 
the Soviet method was signiﬁcant. It represented further evidence that 
theorists were now assuming the new categorical ground of China's 
speciﬁcity. At the conceptual level, in the arena of explanation, analysis 
and suggestion, where controversies attempted either to endorse or to 
anticipate the 'correct line', Soviet experience had a deﬁnite place. It of-
fered evidence for dictums, and proof for contentions. This is why Soviet 
history could be broken up so easily into a series of periods, each almost 
a clear and discontinuous moment, for their use-value was determined 
by China's theorists. Ai and Yang could each have their Lenin and their 
Stalin. The statements of Lenin and Stalin were thus citations, references 
for policy recommendations. Indeed the principle of difference was so 
rooted in China's political discourse that Ai had to reassure his reader-
ship that this did not imply an abandonment of socialism.
Our present line for the transition period has its own particularity, and is 
distinct from the general line for the transition period in the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless both are concerned with the transition to socialism. Therefore 
it may not be said that because China's general line for the transition is 
possessed of its particularity, and is dissimilar to that of the Soviet Union, 
it is not a general line for the transition to socialist society. (Ibid.)
The stance of particularism had created its own equivalent truths 
within the worldview of Marxism-Leninism. 
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Conclusion
It is now clear that during the period when China was following Soviet 
economic strategy, Mao was having serious doubts as to its efﬁcacy. In-
deed, his argument for a more balanced approach, signiﬁed by the 'Ten 
Great Relationships' marked the beginning of a break with the Soviet 
approach. As he said in 1955 in presenting the 'Ten Great Relationships' 
to ministers: 'It made a start on proposing our own line for construction' 
(Mao 1958: 101). Economically, the desire to look inward could be traced 
in part to a general disappointment with the slow pace of agricultural 
growth (Lardy 1987: 160-74). This frustration led in part to the famous 
speed-up in collectivization in 1955-56, which was almost immediately 
followed by a movement to reverse its excesses (ibid.). But this break 
with the Soviet model had of course a more longstanding source, namely 
Mao's enmity towards the Soviet Union (Schram 1989). Without going 
through the entire history of this stormy relationship, here it may simply 
be noted that his rise to power had ultimately come at the expense of 
the 'Returned Students' from Moscow. This was the context for Mao's 
speech of 1937 emphasizing the siniﬁcation of Marxism.
In this regard, Mao's nationalist ideas in the mid-1950s fell on a ground 
that was shared or had already been worked by political economists and 
philosophers. It was not that he followed them, indeed intellectually 
they followed him; their arguments were the realization of his call for 
Chinese Marxism. But it might be suggested that the theories of those 
who wrote for New Construction and the political philosophers formed 
a tributary that ﬂowed into a stream of thought that was insistent that 
China's future was a matter for the Chinese people themselves. The 
argument was that the Soviet model of a command economy was ill 
suited to China's reality. The point of contrast with Lenin's NEP pro-
gramme of state capitalism made it clear that for theorists such as Shen 
Zhiyuan, Qian Jiazhu and Wang Xuewen, China's transition demanded 
a road of speciﬁc design. And it is this stress on national solutions to 
national problems that forms a line that connects this past with China's 
present.
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NOTES
* The author would like acknowledge the contributions made by the anonymous 
reviewers. 
1  On the changing character of the command model, see Brus and Laski (1989, chapters 
4-7).
2 'Somewhat surprisingly, the adoption of a Soviet-style big push industrialization 
strategy involving massive resource mobilization for manufacturing and neglect of 
agriculture does not appear to have been controversial within the CCP. Here there is 
no evidence that prior to the 1st FYP there was anything approaching the industriali-
zation debate in the 1920s in the Soviet Union, which pitted E.A. Preobrazhensky's 
theory of a 'big push' industrialization program against N.I. Bukharin's theory of 
balanced growth of industry and agriculture.' (Lardy 1987). 
3  The discussion above is drawn from Carr (1950).
4  Lardy dates the beginning of the crisis to 1953. 'There were several symptoms of 
that crisis, but these can be traced primarily to a single cause-state intervention in 
grain marketing.' (Lardy 1987).
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